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BANKRUPTCY LAW
Michael A. Condyles*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is intended to advise the general practitioner of sig-
nificant recent developments that have occurred in the bankruptcy
area during the period April 1992 through April 1993. Virginia and
federal decisions issued by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit involving bankruptcy related matters are the main focus of
this article.
Several recent decisions affect the treatment of secured creditors
in bankruptcy proceedings. These decisions clarify existing law and
do not make substantial changes to current practice. Other deci-
sions affect the overall administration of bankruptcy cases. Recent
decisions involving the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act are also addressed.
II. TREATMENT OF SECURED CLAIMS
Several recent bankruptcy decisions impact the treatment of a
secured creditor's claims in a debtor's bankruptcy case. A number
of these opinions address the scope of the automatic stay imposed
at the time bankruptcy is filed. Other decisions focus on such mat-
ters as (i) the modification of a creditor's lien on a debtor's princi-
pal residence in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case; (ii) the treatment
of an assignment of rents provision accompanying a secured credi-
tor's deed of trust; (iii) the release of a judicial lien after a debtor
is discharged in bankruptcy; and (iv) a landlord's removal of ten-
ant's property from leased premises.
* Associate, Maloney, Yeatts & Barr, a Professional Corporation, Richmond, Virginia;
B.A., 1984, James Madison University; J.D., 1987, University of Richmond, T. C. Williams
School of Law. The author is a former law clerk to the Honorable Blackwell N. Shelley,
United States Bankruptcy Court Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond
Division.
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A. The Automatic Stay
Section 362(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code provides
that an automatic stay on certain activities of creditors is imposed
upon debtor filing of a bankruptcy petition.1 The automatic stay is
intended to provide the debtor with a break from the creditor's
collection efforts and to allow for an orderly administration of the
debtor's assets.2 Because of the fundamental role the automatic
stay plays in prohibiting creditors from recovering their collateral
and further exercising their contractual rights against a debtor, its
application is a central focus of bankruptcy decisions.'
One area- that has been critically examined concerns the extent
to which the automatic stay can be applied to persons and entities
or their property not in bankruptcy. This issue was first addressed
within the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in A. H. Robins Co. v.
Piccinin.4 In Piccinin, the Chapter 11 debtor sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent claimants from prosecuting products liability
actions against its insurer, Aetna Surety & Casualty Company, and
certain officers and directors of the debtor. Because of the unusual
situation presented by the case and the intertwined nature of the
debtor and the co-defendants also being sued, the court of appeals
held that a stay should be imposed to prohibit the claimants from
proceeding against the non-debtors. In reflecting on the circum-
stances under which a stay should be extended, the court stated
that:
[t]his "unusual situation," it would seem, arises when there is such
identity between the debtor and the third-party defendant that the
debtor may be said to be the real party defendant and that a judg-
ment against the third-party defendant will in effect be a judgment
or finding against the debtor. An illustration of such a situation
would be a suit against a third-party who is entitled to absolute in-
1. Section 362(b) of the Bankruptcy Code enumerates specific matters which are not af-
fected by the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1988).
2. The legislative history of section 362 provides that "[t]he automatic stay is one of the
fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a
breathing spell from his creditors .... It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or
reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved from the financial pressures that drove him
into bankruptcy." HR REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840-41 (The House bill contained much of the text of the Senate bill
and was passed in lieu of the Senate bill).
3. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
4. 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986).
5. Id. at 999.
[Vol. 27:609
BANKRUPTCY LAW
demnity by the debtor on account of any judgment that might result
against them in the case. To refuse application of the statutory stay
in that case would defeat the very purpose and intent of the
statute.'
The court of appeals re-examined this issue in Credit Alliance
Corp. v. Williams.7 In Credit Alliance, the court held that the au-
tomatic stay does not extend to protect a non-debtor guarantor of
a debtor's obligation. In finding that it was not necessary to stay
the proceeding in order to prevent the dissipation of the debtor's
assets, the court distinguished Piccinin by finding that the "un-
usual situation" required to extend the stay did not exist in this
instance. Accordingly, the court ruled that simply being a guaran-
tor of the debtor's debt without more did not create a basis for an
extension of the automatic stay.9 The court stated:
There is nothing "unusual" about this guaranty agreement that
would permit the guarantor, Williams, to invoke the statutory pro-
tection of § 362 or that would permit us to stay the enforcement of
the New York judgment against him on equitable grounds. It is un-
necessary to stay proceedings or void the judgment against the non-
bankrupt guarantor to protect Penn Hook or to prevent the dissipa-
tion of its assets, since neither Penn Hook nor its estate is jeopard-
ized by the judgment against Williams.10
The court's decision was subsequently followed by a Virginia bank-
ruptcy court in In re Southside Lawn & Garden/Suffolk Yard
Guard."
1. FTL, Inc. v. Crestar Bank
In FTL, Inc. v. Crestar Bank, 2 a Virginia bankruptcy court
found that the requisite "unusual circumstances" as required by
A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Piccinin"3 were present and temporarily
enjoined any action by the creditor against the non-debtor guaran-
6. Id.
7. 851 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1988).
8. Id. at 121.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 121-22.
11. 115 B.R. 79 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
12. 152 B.R. 61 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
13. 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986).
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tors. In FTL, Inc., the debtor and the guarantors sought to tempo-
rarily enjoin Crestar Bank from foreclosing on the guarantors' per-
sonal residence. Crestar Bank was the primary creditor of the
debtor and it maintained a lien against the guarantors' residence.
The debtor filed an amended plan of reorganization calling for the
guarantors to contribute all of the equity in their home to the reor-
ganization. 4 To accomplish this, the guarantors obtained a
$115,000 written loan commitment requiring a second deed of trust
on their home.15 In distinguishing Credit Alliance Corp. v. Wil-
liams'" and In re Southside Lawn & Garden/Suffolk Yard
Guard,17 the court found that FTL, Inc. fit within the narrow ex-
ception created in Piccinin.s The court based its distinction on
four points. First, the court determined that the collection activi-
ties resulted from the same obligation owed by the debtor and not
separate personal obligations.'" Second, the court found that with-
out the guarantor's assistance, it would be virtually impossible for
the debtor to confirm a plan of reorganization.2" Third, because the
proposed injunction of collection activities was only temporary, lit-
tle or no harm would be caused by prohibiting the actions against
the guarantors.21 Finally, the court emphasized that all creditors
would be served best by giving the debtor the opportunity to pro-
ceed with its proposed reorganization plan.22 Based on these spe-
cial circumstances, the court followed the Piccinin decision and ex-
tended the automatic stay to non-debtor guarantors.
2. Willis v. Celotex Corp.
In Willis v. Celotex Corp.,23 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered whether the automatic stay should be extended
to prohibit executions on a supersedeas bond posted to secure an
appeal of asbestos related judgments. In order to obtain a surety's
participation in posting the bond, the debtor was required to
purchase certificates of deposit in return for the issuance of irrevo-
14. Id. at 62.
15. Id.
16. 851 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1988).
17. 115 B.R. 79 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
18. FTL, Inc., 152 B.R. at 63.
19. Id. at 63-64.
20. Id. at 64.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 978 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1992).
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cable letters of credit in favor of the surety. Immediately following
an appellate ruling affirming the judgments, the debtor filed for
Chapter 11 relief. Contending that it had an identity of interest
with the surety and that the supersedeas bond represented an as-
set of its bankruptcy estate, the debtor sought to have the auto-
matic stay extended to prevent the judgment creditor from execut-
ing on the bond.24
The court reflected that there was no merit to the debtor's argu-
ment that the bond constituted an asset because the unfavorable
appellate decision extinguished any interest the debtor had in the
bond.25 Relying instead on language contained in Piccinin, the
court of appeals concluded that the bankruptcy court had the in-
herent power to enjoin a proceeding that would have an adverse
impact on the debtor's ability to formulate a Chapter 11 plan.26
Because of this adverse impact on the debtor the court found suffi-
cient grounds to extend the stay. 7
3. In re Geris
In In re Geris,25 an action was brought to avoid a secured credi-
tor's foreclosure sale of a non-debtor's property. The real estate
was subject to a deed of trust securing debt guaranteed by a Chap-
ter 11 debtor.29
To avoid the foreclosure sale, the debtor argued that its right of
redemption arising from the guaranty created a sufficient interest
in the property to prohibit foreclosure without first obtaining relief
from the automatic stay. 0 The court of appeals held that the
24. Id.
25. Id. at 149.
26. Id. In referencing the Piccinin decision, the court of appeals states that "[w]e have
held that a bankruptcy court may properly exercise its authority under § 105(a) to enjoin
an action against a third party when the court finds 'that failure to enjoin would effect [sic]
the bankruptcy estate and would adversely or detrimentally influence and pressure the
debtor through the third party."' Celotex, 978 F.2d at 149 quoting A.H. Robbins Co. v.
Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1003 (4th Cir. 1946) (quoting Otero Mills v. Security Bank & Trust,
25 B.R. 1018, 1020 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1982)).
27. Celotex 978 F.2d at 150.
28. 973 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1992).
29. Id. at 320.
30. Section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a creditor the right to obtain relief
from the automatic stay in certain instances. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988). Section 362(d)(1)
allows for relief from the automatic stay for "cause." Section 362(d)(2) allows for relief from
stay with respect to an act against property in which the debtor does not have an equity and
in which such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. Id.
6131993]
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debtor did not maintain a sufficient interest to invoke section
362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.31 Although the court found that
the debtor had a material interest in maximizing the value of the
property, this interest was insufficient to warrant protection. Spe-
cifically, the court stated that "[t]he interest Geris has in seeing
that the value of the property, when sold to satisfy the debt, is
maximized, thereby limiting the exposure of the bankruptcy estate
on the underlying debt, is far too attenuated to warrant extending
the automatic stay protections of the Bankruptcy Code . . ." to
prevent the foreclosure sale from occurring.32
4. In re March
A similar analysis of section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code was
applied in In re March3 3 to determine whether a creditor could
foreclose on a non-debtor's real property where the debtor main-
tained a junior lien against the property. 4 In addressing whether a
superior lienholder should be granted relief from the automatic
stay, the district court examined whether the non-debtor's prop-
erty became property of the bankruptcy estate as a result of the
debtor's junior lien.3 5 In holding that the non-debtor's real prop-
erty did not constitute property of the bankruptcy estate, the court
concluded that the automatic stay did not apply.3 6
5. In re Murray
In In re Murray,7 a Virginia bankruptcy court addressed
whether certain property of the debtor's late husband could be
treated as property of her bankruptcy estate for the purpose of
31. In re Geris, 973 F.2d at 321.
32. Id.
33. 140 B.R. 387 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd 988 F.2d 1498 (4th Cir. 1993).
34. Id. at 388-89.
35. Id.
36. Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Whiting
Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983), the court in In re March concluded that the bankruptcy
estate does not include property of others in which a debtor has a minor lien interest. In
quoting Whiting Pools, the court stated:
Section 541(a)(1) speaks in terms of the debtor's "interest ... in property," rather
than property in which the debtor has an interest, but this choice of language was not
meant to limit the expansive scope of the section. The legislative history indicates
that Congress intended to exclude from the estate property of others in which the
debtor had some minor interest such as a lien or bare legal title.
In re March, 140 B.R. at 389, (quoting Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204 n.8).
37. 147 B.R. 688 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
614 [Vol. 27:609
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enforcing the automatic stay.3 8 The property sought to be pro-
tected by the' automatic stay included assets owned solely by the
debtor's late husband and property owned by corporations in
which the debtor's late husband was a shareholder. 9 In determin-
ing whether the automatic stay should be extended, the court ana-
lyzed whether the assets constituted property of the estate under
section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.40 In finding that state law
must define the debtor's rights in property, the court held that the
debtor maintained no interest in the assets sought to be covered by
the automatic stay. As a result, the court declined to extend the
automatic stay to property not directly owned by the debtor.41
These recent decisions clarify when the automatic stay can be
extended beyond a debtor's bankruptcy estate. The rulings in
FTL, Inc. and Willis extending the automatic stay to non-debtors,
reversed a previous trend toward limiting the application of the
stay only to debtors who had filed for bankruptcy relief. Thus,
debtors are given greater certainty in their pre-bankruptcy
planning.
Similarly, decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit involving the application of the automatic stay
to non-debtor property resolved issues that had not been previ-
ously addressed in significant detail. These decisions limit a
debtor's ability to shield properties in which he maintains a remote
interest from creditors, and will provide secured creditors with
greater certainty in enforcing their lien rights.
B. Modification of Secured Creditor's Claim under Chapter 13
A Virginia bankruptcy court recently addressed the extent to
which a debtor can modify a secured creditor's claim under a
Chapter 13 plan. In In re Wilson,42 the bankruptcy court held that
a debtor in a Chapter 13 plan could reduce a secured creditor's
contractual rate of interest to reflect the current market rate in the
38. Id. at 689.
39. Id.
40. Property of the estate is defined in § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code to include "all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case," as well
as property "that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after
[the petition date] ... by bequests, devise or inheritance. "In re Murray, 147 B.R. at
690 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A)).
41. In re Murray, 147 B.R. at 690-91.
42. 144 B.R. 318 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992).
1993]
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area. The court's decision turned on an interpretation of section
1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Under section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, a creditor's
claim secured by property other than a debtor's principal residence
can be modified by a debtor's Chapter 13 plan.4" Section 1325(a)(5)
of the Bankruptcy Code limits the extent of the modification. 44
The manner in which a debtor can modify the claim of a secured
creditor in a Chapter 13 plan was the subject of the court's analy-
sis in Wilson.
In Wilson, the debtor sought to modify a creditor's claim which
was secured by a deed of trust against the debtor's principal resi-
dence. 45 The creditor's loan documents provided for an 11.95 per-
cent contract rate of interest. The debtor's plan provided for inter-
est to accrue at the rate of ten percent.46 In holding that the
language of section 1322(b)(2) clearly and unequivocably allows a
debtor to modify the rights of a secured creditor, the court deter-
mined that the contract rate of interest could be reduced to ten
percent, the current area market rate.47
43. Although In re Wilson addresses a situation where the debtor sought to modify a
second deed of trust secured only by the debtor's principal residence, the court noted that
§ 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code only excludes modification of first mortgages filed
against a debtor's principal residence. Id. at 319.
44. Section 1325(a) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth specific requirements which must
be met in order for a Chapter 13 plan to be confirmed. With regard to the manner in which
the plan treats a secured creditor, section 1325(a)(5) allows three situations under which a
plan shall be confirmed. The first occurs when the secured creditor accepts the terms of the
Chapter 13 plan. The second situation involves the "cram down" provisions of Chapter 13,
which are applied when the debtor does not wish to surrender the collateral and the secured
creditor does not consent to the plan. Under a cram down, the Chapter 13 plan must pro-
vide that the secured creditor retains its lien against the property securing its claim and the
value of the property to be distributed to the creditor under the plan must not be less than
the allowed amount of the secured claim. The third manner in which a secured claimant can
be treated under section 1325(a)(5) allows for the debtor to surrender the collateral. 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1988).
45. See supra note 26.
46. Wilson, 144 B.R. at 319.
47. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code suggests that Congress intended to
allow for the imposition of a market rate of interest under a debtor's Chapter 13 plan. See,
e.g., H.R. 1085, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 19(2)(A) (1983); H.R. 1169, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 19(2)(A) (1983); H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 19(2)(A) (1981) (Congress rejecting an
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code requiring the contract rate of interest to be paid). The
effect of a debtor's ability to modify a secured creditor's claim has been interpreted by some
courts as requiring the creditor to make a new loan in the amount of the value of the collat-
eral. See, e.g., Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982). In
deciding the basis for determining the amount of the market rate of interest, some courts
have used the treasury bill rate as a benchmark. See, e.g., In re Lassiter, 104 B.R. 119
(Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1989); In re Fisher, 8 Collier's Bankr. Cas. 2d 628 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
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The bankruptcy court's decision in In re Wilson allows a debtor
more flexibility in the treatment of a secured creditor's claim. By
readjusting the rate of interest to reflect the current market, debt-
ors will receive an advantage if interest rates have decreased at the
time of the bankruptcy filing. Similarly, creditors should be able to
take advantage of any increase that occurs.
C. Assignment of Rents
In Virginia, the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to the
"creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate. ' 48 As a
result, a secured creditor's interest in rents received from real
property is created by an assignment of rents clause, typically a
part of a recorded deed of trust against the property. The secured
creditor's interest created under the assignment of rents clause is
governed by state law.49 In order to clarify a creditor's rights under
an assignment of rents clause, the Virginia General Assembly en-
acted section 55-220.1 of the Code of Virginia in 1992, addressing
the perfection of liens or interests in rents and profits received
from real estate.50
The interest a secured creditor maintains under an instrument
creating an assignment of rents is important in a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy context. The issue determines the debtor's right to use such
property in connection with a Chapter 11 reorganization. While in
Chapter 11, a debtor has broad authority to use property of the
bankruptcy estate in connection with the operation of its business
in the ordinary course.51 However, when a creditor's collateral is
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-104(j) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
49. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
50. Act of Mar. 22, 1993, ch. 427, 1993 Va. Acts 500 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-220.1
(Supp. 1993). The text of the statute follows:
The recordation pursuant to § 55-106, in the county or city in which the real prop-
erty is located, of any deed, deed of trust or other instrument granting, transferring
or assigning the interest of the grantor, transferor, assignor, pledgor or lessor in
leases, rents or profits arising from the real property described in such deed, deed of
trust or other instrument, shall fully perfect the interest of the grantee, transferee,
pledgee or assignee as to the assignor and all third parties without the necessity of (i)
furnishing notice to the assignor or lessee, (ii) obtaining possession of the real prop-
erty, (iii) impounding the rents, (iv) securing the appointment of a receiver, or (v)
taking any other affirmative action. The lessee is authorized to pay the assignor until
the lessee receives written notification that rents due or to become due have been
assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee. This section shall apply to
all instruments of record before, on or after July 1, 1992.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-220.1 (1986 & Supp. 1993).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1988).
1993]
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"cash collateral," '52 a creditor is provided special protection under
the Bankruptcy Code. This protection prohibits the debtor from
using cash collateral without first receiving court authority or the
creditor's consent, thus preventing the creditor from becoming an
involuntary lender to the Chapter 11 debtor.53
In In re Hall Colttree Associates,54 a Virginia bankruptcy court
addressed the treatment of an assignment of rents provision ac-
companying a deed of trust recorded against real estate. In first
examining the property interest maintained by the secured credi-
tor, the court found that a "perfected" assignment of rents existed
as a result of the recording of the assignment.55 The court then
addressed whether simply maintaining a perfected interest in the
assignment of rents was sufficient to constitute cash collateral or
whether an immediate entitlement to the rents was required. In
finding that the perfection of the assignment of rents was sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code,
the court determined that the rents constituted cash collateral. 6
The bankruptcy court's decision in Hall Colttree Associates is in
accord with decisions interpreting Virginia law as it applies to as-
signment of rents in the context of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.57 The court's holding is also consistent with section 55-
220.1 of the Code of Virginia which provides that an assignment of
rents is perfected upon recording in the land records. As a result,
52. Under the Bankruptcy Code, cash collateral is broadly defined as:
Cash, negotiable instruments, documents, documents of title, securities, deposit ac-
counts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity
other than the estate have an interest and includes the proceeds, products, offsprings,
rents or profits of property subject to a security interest as provided in § 552(b), ...
whether existing before or after the commencement of a case under [the Bankruptcy
Code]....
11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988).
53. Id. § 363(c)(2).
54. 146 B.R. 675 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
55. Id. at 677. The court concluded that a perfected assignment of rents resulted from the
Colttree Associates recording of the assignment. Id. The court's decision parallels the statu-
tory provisions of section 55-220.1 of the Code of Virginia which provides that an assign-
ment of an interest in rents or profits arising from real property is fully perfected when
recorded. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-220.1 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
56. Id. at 679.
57. See In re Brandon Associates, 128 B.R. 729 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991); In re Hall Elm
Tree Associates, 126 B.R. 73 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1991): In re Vienna Park Properties, 120 B.R.
332 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1990), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 136 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y.
1992).
[Vol. 27:609618
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the court's decision should not have a substantial impact on the
existing treatment of assignment of rents in Chapter 11 cases.
D. Post-Discharge Release of Judgment Liens
In Leasing Service Corp. v. Justice,58 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia addressed the application of section 8.01-455 of the Code of
Virginia with regard to releasing judgment liens of a debtor after
receiving a discharge in bankruptcy.59 In Justice, a judgment was
entered against a debtor in excess of $2,000,000.0 Prior to the
debtor filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, the judgment
creditor docketed its judgment in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit
Court of Wise County, Virginia. In connection with his bankruptcy
case, the debtor was discharged of any personal liability under the
judgment and pursuant to Code of Virginia section 8.01-455, the
debtor sought to have the docketed judgment marked "discharged
in bankruptcy."61
The circuit court found that the judgment creditor could not
identify any property owned or recorded by the debtor in Wise
County. Therefore, the court held that "no judgment lien ever at-
tached" and ordered that the judgment be released. 2 On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the judgment lien
was not "paid off or discharged" in the debtor's bankruptcy pro-
ceeding with regard to any real property interest located in Wise
County and acquired prior to the bankruptcy proceeding.6 The
court concluded that the debtor's discharge of the judgment lien
would only apply to property acquired after the commencement of
the bankruptcy proceeding.
6 4
58. Leasing Service Corp. v. Justice, 243 Va. 441, 416 S.E.2d 439 (1992).
59. Section 8.01-455(A) of the Code of Virginia provides that:
[a] defendant in any judgment ... may, on motion, after ten days' notice thereof to
the plaintiff in such judgment ... apply to the court in which the judgment was
rendered, to have the same marked satisfied, and upon proof that the judgment has
been paid off or discharged, such court shall order such satisfaction to be entered on
the margin of the page in the book wherein such judgment was entered .... Upon a
like motion and similar proceeding, the court may order to be marked "discharged in
bankruptcy," any judgment which may be shown to have been so discharged.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-455(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
60. Justice, 243 Va. at 442, 416 S.E.2d at 440.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 443, 416 S.E.2d at 440.
63. Id.
64. Id.
1993] 619
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E. Landlord's Seizure of Tenant's Property
In Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois,5 the defendant seized and
removed the tenant's mobile home from the landlord's property in
the presence of deputy sheriffs. Although the tenant was in default
on his lease, the United States Supreme court held that the seizure
implicated the tenant's Fourth Amendment rights because the
landlord failed to comply with the appropriate eviction statutes.66
The court concluded that an unreasonable seizure of the tenant's
property occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.67
Although the Court noted that the matters addressed in Soldal
did not concern a "garden variety landlord, tenant or commercial
dispute," the decision may impact the willingness of sheriffs' of-
fices to assist creditors in recovery. The decision also makes clear
that the presence of a sheriff does not preclude a finding that the
creditor committed wrongful acts.
III. PRE-BANKRUPTCY COLLECTION EFFORTS
Several recent decisions will impact a creditor's efforts to collect
outstanding debts. These cases interpret two federal statutes
known as the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act6" (FDCPA) and
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act"0 (ECOA) which were enacted to
protect and further the rights of borrowers. 1 More specifically, the
65. 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).
66. Id. at 543.
67. Id. Although the Court determined that a seizure violating the Fourth Amendment
occurred, the Court was careful to note that a different question regarding the reasonable-
ness of the seizure must be addressed by the trial court before a constitutional violation
could be found. In. finding that a seizure occurred, the Court reasoned that the protections
of the Fourth Amendment applied not only to safeguard an individual's privacy and liberty,
but also a person's possessory interest in property. Id.
68. Id. at 549.
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 to 16920 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The purpose of the FDCPA is to
eliminate abusive, deceptive and unfair debt collection practices. Id. at § 1692(e).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 to 1692f (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The purpose of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act is to eradicate discriminatory lending practices. CMF Virginia Land, L.P.
v. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. 90, 94 (E.D. Va. 1992). See also Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666
F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982); Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566, 569
(D.C. Cir. 1979). The Equal Credit Opportunity Act states that "[iut shall be unlawful for
any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit
transaction ... on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or
age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract)." 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1988 &
Supp. III 1991).
71. See supra notes 46-47.
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purpose of the FDCPA is to protect consumers from unscrupulous
and abusive debt bollection practices,"2 while the ECOA was en-
acted in order to eliminate discrimination associated with the ex-
tension of credit.7 3
A. ECOA Claims
In CMF Virginia Land, L.P. v. Brinson,74 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia examined the de-
fendants' assertions of an ECOA violation, in an effort to prohibit
the plaintiff from collecting under the defendants' guaranty agree-
ments. In accordance with the provisions of the ECOA, 5 regulation
b, promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board states that "a credi-
tor shall not require the signature of an applicant's spouse or other
person, other than a joint applicant, on any credit instrument if
the applicant qualifies under the creditor's standards of credit wor-
thiness for the amount and terms of the credit requested. 7 6 The
defendants, who were husband and wife, contended that the credi-
tor's conditioning of the loan on obtaining the spousal guaranties
violated the regulation. The defendants argued that the violations
relieved them of any liability arising in connection with the
guaranties. 7
In addressing the application of the ECOA, the court noted that
regulation b was promulgated for the purpose of preventing credit
discrimination against married women who had traditionally been
refused individual credit.78 The court stated that:
It is well-documented that, prior to the ECOA, it was customary for
lenders to require the guarantee signatures of husbands whose wives
sought credit, even when a credit check would have revealed that
the wife was credit worthy on her own. The ECOA was implemented
to prevent this discriminatory practice of forcing women to have
their spouses guarantee any loan they wished to receive. In this case,
72. See supra note 46.
73. See supra note 47.
74. 806 F. Supp. at 90.
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
76. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1)(1992).
77. The defendants' basis for avoiding liability under their guaranties in Brinson has been
recognized as a valid application of the ECOA by other courts. See Douglas County Nat'l
Bank v. Pfeiff, 809 P.2d 1100 (Colo. App. 1991); In Re Remington, 19 B.R. 718, (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1982); NationsBank v. Sarelson, VA. L. WKLY. 092-8-427 (Fairfax Co. Cir. Ct. 1992);
First American Bank v. McCarty, VA. L. WKLY. 092-8-428 (Fairfax Co. Cir. Ct. 1992).
78. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. at 96.
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however, as in many recent cases brought under the ECOA, male
borrowers attempt to invoke the ECOA when a lender requires their
wives signatures as co-guarantors on a loan instrument. s
Although the court recognized that the plain language of the
ECOA forbids discrimination "against any applicant," it expressed
reservations about rendering void a guaranty which violates the
ECOA in a manner not expressly intended by the statute.80 How-
ever, the court ruled that the defendants' claims should be decided
at trial and not on summary judgment. Accordingly, the court rec-
ognized that the defendants could potentially maintain a valid
claim under the ECOA which would extinguish all or a part of
their liability arising in connection with their guaranties.
Similarly, in NationsBank v. Sarelson81 and First American
Bank v. McCarty,82 the Fairfax County Circuit Court addressed
whether the ECOA could be used as a basis for defeating a credi-
tor's claim under a guaranty. In both cases, violations of the ECOA
were asserted as a basis for setting aside confessed judgments en-
tered against the defendants under section 8.01-433 of the Code of
Virginia.8 In finding that the asserted ECOA violations created an
"adequate defense" under section 8.01-433, the court ruled that
both judgments should be set aside and remanded the cases for
trial on the merits of the asserted ECOA violations.8 4
79. Id. at 96 n.4.
80. In Brinson the court states that:
[w]hile the [c]ourt agrees that the plain language of the ECOA forbids discrimination
"against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction, which is
based on marital status," . . . the [c]ourt is especially averse to rendering void a
Guaranty whose execution violated the ECOA.in a manner not expressly targeted by
the statute.
Id. (quoting Markham, 605 F.2d at 569).
81. NationsBank v. Sarelson, VA. L. WKLY. 092-8-427.
82. First American Bank v. McCarty, VA. L. WKLY. 092-8-428.
83. The Code of Virginia provides that a confessed judgment can be set aside where a
defendant raises "any ground which would have been an adequate defense or setoff in an
action at law instituted upon the judgment creditor's note, bond or other evidence of debt
upon which such judgment was confessed." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-433 (Repl. Vol. 1992) In
both Sarelson and McCarty, the court indicated that the decisive issue that must be ad-
dressed is whether the defendants raised an "adequate defense" by asserting a violation of
the ECOA. In addressing whether the confessed judgment could be set aside, the court
noted that it did not have to decide the validity and effectiveness of the defenses. Instead,
the court determined that a trial on the merits was required to resolve the factual issues
raised by the alleged ECOA violations. Sarelson, VA. L. WKLY. 092-8-427; McCarty, VA. L.
WKLY. 092-8-428.
84. Sarelson,
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Alleging violations of the ECOA as a defense to individual liabil-
ity under a guaranty agreement has become an increasingly popu-
lar response to collection actions. Although the reviewed decisions
did not issue final rulings, the cases provide defendants with suffi-
cient authority to raise the claim in good faith. As a result, it is
likely that the use of ECOA in responding to creditor suits will
increase and provide debtors with an additional defense.
B. FDCPA Claims
In an attempt to restrict abusive practices, the FDCPA was en-
acted to impose limitations on the actions of "debt collectors."8 5 In
Scott v. Jones,86 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ad-
dressed whether the FDCPA applied to an attorney initiating law-
suits to collect delinquent credit card accounts. In Scott, the de-
fendant argued that the FDCPA did not apply because he was
engaged in the practice of law and not the collection of debts.
Agreeing with the lower court's conclusion that the "principal
purpose" of the defendant's business was the collection of debts,
the court of appeals ruled that the FDCPA applied to the attor-
ney's activities.8 The court noted that seventy to eighty percent of
the defendant's legal fees were generated from debt collection legal
work.88 The court concluded that because the attorney filed ap-
proximately four thousand warrants in debt per year between 1983
and 1987, the defendant regularly collected or attempted to collect
debts.8 9 As a result, the court determined that the defendant's ac-
tivities clearly fell within the scope of the FDCPA.90
85. The FDCPA has defined the term "debt collector" to mean "any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of
which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly
or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(6)(1988).
86. 964 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1992).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 316.
89. Id.
90. In Scott, the defendant argued that attorneys and law firms were excluded from the
FDCPA's definition of "debt collectors." In support of this argument, the debtor referred to
legislative history and to the Federal Trade Commission's interpretation of the meaning of
"collection of debt." See H.R. REP. No. 405, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-7, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752; 132 CONG. REc. H10031 (1986); Federal Trade Commission's Statements
of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,100-02 (1988). The court found that the legislative history was
not ambiguous and that the administrative interpretations of the statute did not disturb
Congress' intent but only clarified the type of legal activity which would fall within the
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Based on Scott, an attorney may qualify as a "debt collector"
under the FDCPA in two ways. The first involves a situation where
any "instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails" is used
in connection with a business whose "principal purpose" is the col-
lection of debts. The second is where the attorney "regularly col-
lects or attempts to collect" debts in connection with the practice
of law.91 A determination of whether an attorney will be treated as
a "debt collector" will be decided on a case by case basis in accor-
dance with the specific facts relative to each attorney's practice.92
In Carroll v. Wolpoff & Abramson,93 the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit further interpreted the FDCPA as it applied to
a law firm's follow-up collection notice sent to a debtor. Specifi-
cally, the court reviewed section 1692(e) of the FDCPA which pro-
vides in pertinent part that:
[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the
following conduct is a violation of this section: . . . the failure to
disclose clearly in all communications made to collect a debt or to
obtain information about a consumer, that the debt collector is at-
tempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be
used for that purpose."4
The defendant law firm asserted that a distinction existed in the
statute between initial and subsequent communications by arguing
that section 1692 did not apply to a follow-up notice.95 The court
found that the statute clearly states that "all communications"
must comply with the disclosure requirements, and the law firm
violated the FDCPA by failing to include the necessary disclosure
in its correspondence.96
ambit of "debt collection." Thus, the Court disregarded the defendant's arguments. Scott,
964 F.2d at 316-17.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)().
92. See Scott, 964 F.2d at 316-17.
93. 961 F.2d 459 (4th Cir. 1992).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(11)(1993).
95. Although the defendant did not dispute the clarity of the language of the FDCPA
requiring disclosure in "all communications made to collect a debt," it argued that Congress'
intent to avoid debtor abuse would not be furthered by requiring the disclosure require-
ments in follow-up letters. Carroll, 961 F.2d at 461.
96. Id.
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IV. PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS
Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code allows individual debtors to
exempt certain property from becoming an asset of their bank-
ruptcy estates.9 The Bankruptcy Code allows a state to elect not
to apply the federal bankruptcy exemptions,98 rather adopting
their own separate exemptions.9 Although Virginia's exemption
statutes apply to both debtors and non-debtors alike, the majority
of opinions interpreting Virginia's exemption laws are rendered in
connection with bankruptcy cases. This stems from the importance
exemptions play in the administration of bankruptcy cases.
A. Objection to Exemptions
Several recent decisions have addressed the validity of objections
raised to a debtor's claim of exemptions. Section 522(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that "[u]nless a party in interest ob-
jects, the property claimed as exempt . . . is exempt." Rule
4003(b) of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure requires that objec-
tions must be raised by the trustee or any creditor within thirty
days of the creditors meeting. °00 The objection period may be ex-
tended upon a timely motion.101
1. Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz
In Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,' °2 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the validity of an exemption that was not ob-
jected to within the thirty-day period. In Taylor the debtor filed
bankruptcy while pursuing an employment discrimination claim in
state court. 0 3 In her bankruptcy schedules, the debtor exempted
the damage award she expected to receive. The value of the award
was listed as "unknown.' 0 4
After conducting an initial examination, the Chapter 7 trustee
appointed to administer the debtor's estate did not object, even
though the statute creating the exemption only allowed a small
97. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
98. Id. § 522(b)(1).
99. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
100. FED. R. BANKR. 4003(b).
101. Id.
102. 112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992).
103. Id. at 1646.
104. Id.
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portion of the potential recovery to be claimed exempt. After the
debtor received a $110,000.00 settlement, the trustee sought to re-
cover the funds on the 'grounds that the money was property of the
bankruptcy estate.0 5 In finding that no statutory basis existed for
claiming the exemption, the bankruptcy court ordered the monies
be turned over to the trustee.106 The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court's decision and the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed. 107 The court of appeals determined that be-
cause the funds were claimed as exempt and the trustee failed to
object to the claimed exemption in a timely manner, the debtor
was not required to turn over the funds. The decision was subse-
quently affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.108
In concluding that the property was in fact exempt, the Supreme
Court relied on the clear language of section 522(1) and Rule
4003(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court stated that under sec-
tion 522(1) the property claimed as exempt is exempt unless a
party in interest objects. 09 Further, the court noted that:
Rule 4003(b) gives the trustee and creditors 30-days from the initial
creditors' meeting to object. By negative implication, the Rule indi-
cates that creditors may not object after 30-days "unless, within
such period, further time is granted by the Court." The Bankruptcy
Court did not extend the 30-day period. Section 522(1) therefore has
made the property exempt. Taylor cannot contest the exemption at
this time, whether or not Davis had a colorable statutory basis for
claiming it.110
Accordingly, the Court found that the trustee's failure to object
qualified the property as exempt regardless of the validity of the
exemption."'
105. See generally In re Murray, 147 B.R. 688, 690-91 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
106. Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1647.
107. Id. at 1647.
108. Id. at 1649.
109. Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1648 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522).
110. Id. at 1648.
111. The Supreme Court's decision in Taylor impacts the court of appeals ruling in Wiss-
man v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 942 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1991). In Wissman, the debtor
claimed as exempt a cause of action against a creditor bank arising out of the bank's foreclo-
sure on certain collateral. A timely objection to the debtor's exemption was not filed and the
debtor proceeded in federal district court to enforce its claim. Although the debtor properly
claimed the exemption, the debtor did not assert the interest's value. Because of a statutory
limit to the amount that could be exempt, the court stated that the debtor's exemption
could not exceed the limit. Wissman, 942 F.2d at 872.
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2. In re Grablowsky
In In re Grablowsky,1 2 a Virginia bankruptcy court distin-
guished the application of Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz 1 3 in a case
with a similar fact pattern. The debtor in Grablowsky assigned a
value of one dollar to his interests in two partnerships.1 4 The
debtor exempted the partnership interests and no objection was
filed within the thirty-day period. 5 Subsequently, a third party
sought authority from the court to purchase the debtor's non-ex-
empt interest in the partnerships from the trustee." 6 Because no
objection was filed, the debtor contended that its claimed exemp-
tions, in the amount of one dollar each, constituted a complete ex-
emption of the partnership interests. 117 The potential purchaser
argued that the debtor was only entitled to an exemption of one
dollar for each partnership interest, and the remaining value of the
assets became the property of the bankruptcy estate.
The court distinguished the facts of Grablowsky from Taylor on
the grounds that the exemptions were claimed for precise amounts.
Specifically, the court stated that:
In Taylor the value of the exempted property was listed as "un-
known" and in this case the value of the exempted property is listed
as "$1.00." This distinction is pivotal in that the Supreme Court's
decision in Taylor arguably supports a conclusion in this case oppo-
site the one asserted by the debtor. If the debtor is entitled to ex-
emption by declaration, then the debtor is (sic) bound by his decla-
ration. In this case the debtor declared exempt $1.00 of his interest
in each partnership, and that is all that has been exempted.1 8
Here, the court failed to address the commonly accepted view that
the entire asset is exempt where the debtor claims an exemption in
an amount equal to the property value listed in the schedules." 9
112. 149 B.R. 402 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
113. Taylor, 112 S. Ct. 1644.
114. Grablowsky, 149 B.R. at 403.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 404.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 405.
119. One commentator has stated that "[o]nly when a debtor's schedules specifically
value the debtor's interest in the property at an amount higher than the amount claimed as
exempt can it be argued that a part of the debtor's interest in property has not been ex-
empted." 8 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 4003.04, at 4002-13 (Lawrence P. King ed., 1993).
Collier's further states that:
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3. In re Leydet
In In re Leydet,120  a Virginia bankruptcy court addressed
whether a new thirty-day period for objecting to exemptions arose
when a debtor's Chapter 11 case is converted to a Chapter 7
case. 2' The debtor in Leydet claimed corporate stock as exempt in
his Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. 122 The debtor valued the stock
at one dollar. A meeting of creditors was held in the Chapter 11
case and no objection to the exemption was filed within thirty
days. 23 Subsequently, the case was converted to a Chapter 7 case
and a creditor's meeting was held. 124 Within thirty days following
the Chapter 7 meeting of creditors, the trustee objected to the ex-
emption, claiming that the stock had value substantially above the
one dollar declared exempt.12
5
The court addressed whether a new period for objecting to ex-
emptions arose as a result of the conversion of the bankruptcy
case. Because the time for filing objections begins with the credi-
tors meeting, 26 the court analyzed whether a subsequent meeting
of creditors would result in a new objection period. 27 In holding
that a new thirty-day period for objecting to exemptions began af-
ter the Chapter 7 meeting of creditors, the court found that the
objections were timely filed.128
[n]ormally, if the debtor lists property as exempt, that listing is interpreted as a
claim for exemption of the debtor's entire interest in the property, with the debtor's
valuation of that interest as the amount of the exemption claimed. Were it otherwise,
with the claim of exemption construed to claim as exempt only that portion of the
property having the value stated, the provisions finalizing exemptions if no objections
are filed would be rendered meaningless. The trustee or creditors could always claim
that the debtor's interest in the property was greater than the value claimed as ex-
empt and effectively still object to the debtor exempting his or her entire interest in
the property after the deadline for objections had passed.
Id. at 1 4003.03.
120. 150 B.R. 641 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
121. Id. at 642.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
127. Leydet, 150 B.R. at 642-44. The court stated: "[u]nfortunately Bankruptcy Rule
4003(b) does not address whether in a converted case the 'meeting of creditors' referred to is
only the initial meeting of creditors, or whether the second meeting of creditors triggers a
new 30-day period for objections to exemptions." Id. at 643.
128. Leydet appears to conflict with In re Freedlander, 93 B.R. 446 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1988). In Freedlander, an objection was raised to a homestead exemption filed in a Chapter
7 case which had been converted from Chapter 11. The basis of the objection was that the
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B. Poor Debtors Exemption
Section 34-26 of the Code of Virginia sets forth certain "poor
debtor" exemptions.12 9 These exemptions are intended to provide
an individual and his family with the bare necessities required to
sustain daily life.130
In Davis v. Maloney' the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed
whether a person must be a Virginia resident to qualify for the
poor debtor exemptions. In analyzing the application of section 34-
26 of the Code of Virginia, the court noted that the poor debtor
exemptions are available to "every householder.' 1 32 Since the term
"every householder" is defined by section 34-1 of the Code of Vir-
ginia as "any resident of Virginia," the court concluded that only a
Virginia resident could claim the poor debtor exemptions. 133
C. Exemption for Personal Injury Claims
Section 34-28.1 of the Code of Virginia provides an exemption
for personal injury claims.13 4 This exemption is available without
any limitation as to amount. The code section was enacted by the
1990 General Assembly in response to the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Tignor v. Parkinson35 which held that personal injury claims
meeting of creditors held in the Chapter 11 case controlled the time within which the home-
stead deed must be filed and therefore the homestead exemption was not timely claimed
pursuant to section 34-17 of the Code of Virginia. This section requires that any person who
fies a voluntary petition in bankruptcy may [file a homestead deed] on or before the 5th
day after the date initially set for the meeting held pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341, but not
thereafter . . . ." VA. CODE ANN. § 34-17 (Repl. Vol. 1990). In finding that "[n]either the
[c]ode nor the [r]ules mandate that another meeting of creditors be held subsequent to a
conversion," the [c]ourt held that the subsequent meeting of creditors was of no conse-
quence. Freedlander, 93 B.R. at 449. In contrast, the bankruptcy court in Leydet found that
based on a reading of sections 341(a) and 348(a) of the Bankruptcy Code "a new meeting of
creditors is required upon conversion from [C]hapter 11 to [C]hapter 7." Leydet, 150 B.R.
at 642. The bankruptcy court in Leydet went on to state that "[tihis new meeting of credi-
tors is not a continuation or extension of the meeting of creditors in the previous [C]hapter
11 proceeding, but is a separate and distinct meeting in which a new trustee must be se-
lected." Leydet, 150 B.R. at 642.
129. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
130. Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Exemption Statutes to the
Governor and the General Assembly of Virginia, H. Doc. No. 77 at 10 (1990).
131. 243 Va. 500, 416 S.E.2d 232 (1992).
132. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
133. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
134. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-28.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
135. 729 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1984) (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-26 (Repl. Vol.
1984)).
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were not exempt based on Virginia's statutory prohibition on the
assignment of tort claims. 138
In In re Cassell, 37 a Virginia bankruptcy court addressed
whether section 34-28.1 applied to proceeds received by a debtor in
connection with a wrongful death action. In holding that the Vir-
ginia General Assembly did not intend to include wrongful death
causes of action within the scope of this statute, the court con-
cluded that the proceeds were not exempt.
136. Id.
137. 151 B.R. 78 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1993).
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